If President Donald Trump had instituted a Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) in 2016, it would not have bothered me regarding the future of the Marine Corps.
For decades, the Corps carved out a unique role in national defense, providing 24/7 coverage in global hotspots like the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, and the Western Pacific.
Marine Expeditionary Units served as rapid-response forces, handling emergencies from natural disasters to the evacuation of American citizens and diplomats.
These small but lethal units could quickly scale up into brigade-sized combat teams, participating in joint operations or conducting full-scale amphibious assaults, as they did in Desert Storm.
But in 2019, this legacy underwent a radical transformation.
Strategic Shift Toward China
Under General David Berger’s tenure as Commandant, the Marine Corps shifted focus toward countering Chinese naval power. This new approach, centered on the Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) concept, envisions small Marine units deploying anti-ship missiles from islands in the South China Sea.
To fund this strategy, much of the Corps’ traditional combined-arms capabilities were sacrificed. General Eric Smith, Berger’s successor, continued this trajectory.
With the advent of DOGE, we may well find that Berger and Smith have walked the Marine Corps into a baited trap ambush of their own making.
I believe I know some of the individuals who will shape whatever organization DOGE morphs into. These are people who have little patience for inefficiency and are dedicated to eliminating waste, redundancy, and inefficiency in government in general and in the Defense Department in particular.
It may be some time before DOGE turns its attention to the Marine Corps, but I can envision a conversation with the Commandant at that point unfolding something like this:
Hypothetical Conversation With DOGE
DOGE: General, you’ve continued Force Design, an anti-Chinese strategy that places small units on islands in the South China Sea. You have been at it for over a half decade. What’s the status of this initiative?
Commandant: Sir, we’ve converted one infantry and one artillery regiment into Littoral Combat Regiments to support the EABO concept.
DOGE: Congratulations, general. How many missiles are ready for deployment?
Commandant: None, sir. Procurement has been more complicated than expected.
DOGE: What’s the range of these missiles, if and when they’re operational?
Commandant: About 100 to 120 nautical miles, sir.
DOGE: How does that impact a Chinese invasion of Taiwan?
Commandant: It depends on which nations we’re operating from. This isn’t just about Taiwan; it’s a broader naval superiority concept.
DOGE: How many nations have signed on to support this concept?
Commandant: None yet. We are counting on the Department of State to work that issue.
DOGE: General, the Army and Navy are developing hypersonic missiles with longer ranges that don’t require regional basing rights. They will be much harder for the Chinese to shoot down than your version. Did the Marine Corps consider partnering with them? That would smack of the kind of needless redundancy that this organization is chartered to eliminate.
Commandant: That decision was made under General Berger’s leadership. You would have to ask him.
DOGE: We are given to understand that General Berger also reduced the Navy’s large amphibious ships from 38 to 31 to fund smaller ships for EABO. How many of these Landing Ship Mediums have been built?
Commandant: Ahh, none sir, the bids came in higher than projected. The Navy is working on the issue.
DOGE: So, you abandoned traditional amphibious warfare for a concept dependent on unproven weapons and international basing agreements, none of which are operational after five years. Why, general, should this organization recommend keeping the Marine Corps? Give me one good reason that the XVIII Airborne Corps could not do the job cheaper and with less overhead.
Commandant: Uhh, let me get back to you on that, sir.
A Nightmare Realized
For all the time that I was in the Marine Corps, and since I retired, Marine Corps leaders worked tirelessly to ensure such questions were never asked. Beginning in 2019, however, those efforts evaporated.
The restructuring gambled on a narrow, unproven strategy, leaving the Corps vulnerable to questions about its relevance and readiness.
The very possible exchange described above was our nightmare scenario.
Making the Marine Corps Great Again
If the Secretary of the Navy wants to preserve the Marine Corps’ legacy, urgent action is needed.
First, leadership must change. Appoint a Commandant committed to restoring the Corps’ combined-arms capabilities and its role as a global rapid-response force.
Second, halt or reassess Force Design until tangible results are achieved.
Finally, re-prioritize investments in platforms and strategies that ensure the Corps’ readiness to respond to crises anywhere, anytime.
Rebuilding the Marine Corps to its pre-2019 capabilities will take years, but it’s a necessary step to deflect the kind of existential questions posed above. Anything less risks the future of one of the world’s premier fighting forces.
Gary Anderson served as the Chief of Plans (G-5) of the Marine Corps Expeditionary Force responsible for the Indo-Pacific area. He was the Director of the X Unit, which evolved into the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab. When he retired, he was the Lab’s Chief of Staff.
He lectures on Alternative Analysis at the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs.
The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of The Defense Post.
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