February marked the 80th anniversary of the Battle of Iwo Jima, the bloodiest and most iconic battle the Marine Corps has ever fought.
Twenty years ago, the Marine Corps Wargaming Division at Quantico conducted a simulation exploring how the battle might unfold using the tactics and technologies envisioned in what would later be called Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS).
Rather than landing in linear waves across a large, heavily defended beach as in 1945, the OMFTS scenario envisioned a 2025 assault using smaller, more agile forces landing in columns across very small, undefended beaches.
The defenders, armed with modern Soviet weaponry, had not pre-registered these beaches with artillery and mortar fire. Advanced landing craft and Navy air-cushioned vehicles, launched from over the horizon, would deliver small, technologically augmented forces, heavily supported by robotics.
Instead of relying solely on live Marines to clear bunkers and caves, the scenario envisioned small ground robots directing precision strikes with kamikaze drones. To root the enemy out of deep caves, other autonomous ground units would explore and detonate inside enemy strongholds, reducing risk to human forces.
Logistics, often a critical vulnerability in large-scale operations, would be revolutionized. Rather than stockpiling massive supply depots — targets that proved costly in 1945 — the new approach proposed “just-in-time” logistics, using robotic helicopters to deliver supplies directly from over-the-horizon ships to frontline troops.
Vision for the Future of Warfare
A written account of this futuristic battle was published in the Navy/Marine Corps Times on the anniversary of the original landings, sparking considerable controversy.
Logisticians, who were just implementing a new computerized logistics system, would be rendered obsolete by Walmart-like just-in-time logistics. Some aviators recoiled at the idea of being replaced by unmanned aircraft for close air support.
By 1998, the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab had taken on some of OMFTS’s technological challenges, such as over-the-horizon communications, miniaturized robotics, and just-in-time logistics.
That year, the Warfighting Lab conducted a wargame simulating a modern refight of the Battle of Okinawa using OMFTS tactics. Retired Lieutenant General Victor “Brute” Krulak —who had proposed an amphibious end run around the heavily fortified Shuri Line during the actual battle — participated as an advisor.
His original plan, rejected in 1945 as too risky, was successfully executed in the wargame with minimal casualties, validating the potential of OMFTS.
Shift Away From OMFTS
By the early 2000s, many of us involved in OMFTS were confident it could be fully operational by 2020. But history had other plans.
The attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan shifted the Marine Corps’ focus to counterinsurgency and prolonged land operations. OMFTS was sidelined, despite significant technological advancements that had since closed many of the capability gaps identified in the 1990s.
By 2020, the sitting Commandant had embraced a vastly different vision for the Marine Corp, Force Design 2030, shifting focus away from large-scale amphibious operations.
Many of us, now retired, believe this was a strategic mistake. Recent conflicts, such as the ongoing Houthi threat to Red Sea shipping, demonstrate the enduring value of a flexible, expeditionary amphibious force. A Navy/Marine Corps punitive amphibious raid, utilizing OMFTS principles, could have neutralized the Houthi threat more effectively than airstrikes alone. Now, we will probably never know.
The technologies envisioned for OMFTS are here — along with advancements we never imagined. While it remains a lost opportunity, it is not too late to reconsider.
The new administration may choose to reassess the defensive posture of Force Design 2030 and put the Marine Corps back on an offensive footing. OMFTS would be a good place to start.
Gary Anderson served as the Chief of Plans (G-5) of the Marine Corps Expeditionary Force responsible for the Indo-Pacific area. He was the Director of the X Unit, which evolved into the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab. When he retired, he was the Lab’s Chief of Staff.
He lectures on Alternative Analysis at the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs.
The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of The Defense Post.
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