The Pentagon is right to accelerate counter-unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) acquisition. But buying faster does not necessarily mean fielding faster.
US adversaries now produce millions of low-cost drones each year, transforming small unmanned aircraft from a tactical nuisance into a persistent operational challenge.
The Department of Defense has responded by centralizing counter-UAS leadership, streamlining doctrine, and accelerating capability delivery. Those efforts are necessary.
As procurement authority becomes increasingly centralized to support this acceleration, the obligation to clearly demonstrate why those decisions are being made must increase as well.
The objective of acquisition is not to move contracts faster. It is to put a capability in the hands of warfighters that can perform its mission under the conditions they will actually face.
The Department of Defense therefore needs a disciplined operational standard for determining whether a counter-drone capability is ready to move from demonstration to fielding. That standard should rest on three principles: operational evidence, warfighter validation, and lifecycle adaptability.
Evidence: Testing Under Operational Conditions
Counter-UAS capabilities are advancing rapidly, and that is a good thing. But a successful demonstration in a controlled environment cannot by itself establish that a system is ready for operational use.
The relevant question is not simply whether a sensor can detect a drone or an effector can defeat one. It is whether the complete system can deliver the required operational effect under realistic conditions — at scale, over time, and against an adaptive threat.
The US Army learned this lesson during the Extended Range Cannon Artillery (ERCA) program. Early testing showed promise: in 2020, ERCA prototypes successfully hit targets 70 kilometers (43 miles) away, demonstrating the extended range the service was seeking. But broader prototyping and live-fire testing exposed a different reality.
The cannon experienced excessive wear after firing relatively few rounds, while persistent engineering challenges delayed planned fielding.
By 2023, the Army concluded that the prototype was not successful enough to move into production and canceled the effort.
What appeared successful when measured primarily by range proved less viable when evaluated for the durability and performance required of an operational system.
Counter-drone systems deserve the same rigorous standard. Evaluation should measure the complete operational sequence required to accomplish the mission, including how individual components perform together.
This distinction is especially critical when the Department is replacing proven, fielded capabilities with emerging alternatives. Newer systems may ultimately offer better performance, greater scalability, or lower sustainment burdens, but when a capability has already been selected to meet an operational requirement, the burden of proof for displacing it must be higher.
The Department may be choosing the right solutions, but the rationale behind decisions involving capability, cost, schedule, production capacity, and operational readiness must be demonstrably grounded in data-supported, validated evidence.
Warfighter Involvement: Operators Define the Standard
From a commander’s perspective, capability only matters if it works within the mission.
Counter-UAS systems will be employed by different units, against different threats, and in very different environments — from homeland defense to every operational theater. A capability that succeeds in one setting may fall short in another.
Operators must therefore help establish evaluation criteria before testing begins. Engineers, acquisition officials, and industry personnel bring essential technical expertise, but operators understand what performance is operationally meaningful.
They understand whether warning arrives in time to act, whether the information supports a clear decision, how the system fits existing battle drills, and what burden a unit can realistically sustain.
Warfighters don’t ask how quickly the contract was signed, rather they ask if the capability works when it is needed.
That operational judgment cannot disappear once a system is purchased. Feedback from units should remain part of the acquisition process after fielding, allowing the Department to identify shortcomings and adjust capabilities as threats and mission requirements change.
Capability: Integration, Sustainment, and Adaptability
Centralized acquisition can help the Department move faster and improve interoperability, but it must preserve enough flexibility to account for how systems will be employed. The objective needs to be common standards that support mission success — not common solutions that assume every mission presents the same problem.
The cost of sustaining complex weapon systems, combined with the rapid evolution of drone threats, makes adaptability a requirement. A counter-UAS system that is effective today may be less effective tomorrow as adversaries change their platforms, tactics, signatures, and methods of attack.
The Patriot system offers a useful example. The US Army has maintained the system’s relevance through successive upgrades to its interceptors, command-and-control systems, software, and radar capabilities rather than replacing the entire capability whenever the threat changed. But the pace of those upgrades has often been measured in years.
Counter-UAS procurement needs a faster adaptive lifecycle. That means designing systems around open, modular architectures that allow better technologies to be integrated into fielded systems as threats evolve, rather than forcing the Department to replace systems that continue to meet mission requirements.
Operational Readiness Is Not Permanent
A counter-UAS system should not be considered operationally ready simply because it has demonstrated that it can defeat a drone.
It should be considered ready when a unit can employ it, integrate it, sustain it, and adapt it against a changing threat.
That standard also cannot remain static. Once fielded, counter-UAS capabilities must continue to be evaluated as they encounter new environments, mission demands, and adversary tactics. Evidence from operations and exercises should inform sustainment decisions, upgrades, and future requirements.
The Department faces a wide range of UAS threats, driving a broad range of missions that will require an equally broad range of counter-UAS solutions. Accelerating acquisition is necessary, but speed cannot come at the expense of operational judgment.
As Washington moves rapidly to field counter-UAS capabilities, it must measure success not by how quickly a system moves through the acquisition process, but by whether it can deliver the required effect when and where warfighters need it.
Accelerated acquisition cannot mean reduced scrutiny. The faster the Department moves, the higher the burden to demonstrate why one capability deserves to replace another. Warfighters deserve nothing less.
Major General Karl Horst is a retired US Army Major General who served for over 37 years.
The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of The Defense Post.
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