After Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, military analysts began to underscore the decisive role of indirect firepower in modern conflict.
This trend has been starkly evident in the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war, where artillery and missile strikes account for an estimated 80 percent of equipment and personnel losses on both sides.
Recognizing this reality, NATO’s support for Ukraine has heavily prioritized artillery systems and maintaining steady ammunition supplies.
However, the West’s decades-long focus on asymmetric, low-intensity conflicts left it unprepared for the demands of prolonged, high-intensity warfare.
This “strategic awakening” has exposed critical gaps in military and industrial readiness. Western defense industries, strained by relentless battlefield consumption, are struggling to meet the skyrocketing demand for artillery shells.
Despite early warnings from NATO commanders, stockpiles were insufficient as the conflict began, exacerbating delays in resupply.
The Ammunition Shortfall
Since the start of the conflict, the West has delivered over 620 artillery guns to Ukraine, along with various missile systems.
The vital importance of artillery became particularly evident earlier in 2024 when, prior to the resumption of US weapons supplies, Ukraine’s armed forces suffered significant territorial losses in the east.
This setback was largely attributed to a shortage of artillery shells. Consequently, Western partners have been compelled to drastically increase the production of 155mm shells, with the EU and US aiming for over 1 million rounds each annually by 2025.
Yet, the current delivery times range from 10 to 20 months, severely limiting Western supply flows — and, as a consequence, Ukrainian military effectiveness.
Modern Artillery Requirements
Recent assessments of modern artillery have focused on its evolution, examining the increasing role of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, targeting, assessment, decentralization of capabilities close to combat units, fluidity, and stealth of sensors and effectors.
Special Advisor to the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukraine Armed Forces Daniel Rice highlighted how Ukraine’s artillery has adapted: “Using better Western made radars to pick up every round that leaves a Russian tube, using HARM missiles to target Russian radars, to take them out and ‘blind’ Russian artillery from firing back. Using Excalibur precision guided 155mm howitzer artillery rounds to target precisely Russian artillery and tanks.”
Similarly, defense specialist Dr. James Bosbotinis emphasized the critical role of ISR: “The effective use of precision weapons, whether artillery or more broadly, will be contingent on supporting ISR to find, fix, track, target, engage and assess enemy assets.” In Ukraine, ISR combined with fires has made the battlefield highly lethal, he explained.
These insights underline the necessity of integrating ISR into modern artillery systems but also highlight limitations in Western supply chains and system durability.
Lessons From Ukraine
Ukraine has employed a diverse array of howitzers — towed, tracked, self-propelled, with or without turret, armored or not — garnering unmatched experience with artillery in high-intensity conflict.
Some of these insights might not be intuitive. For example, armored turrets offer limited protection against drones and loitering munitions. Instead, mobility and evasion have proven more valuable. Wheel-based platforms, for instance, leave fewer traces than tracks, enabling faster repositioning and minimizing exposure to counter-battery fire.
Wheels also offer superior combined off-road and road mobility, as well as tactical and operational mobility to take advantage of residual crossing infrastructure, such as degraded or weak bridges. This maneuverability is proving critical in the ongoing territorial contest following Ukraine’s Kursk incursion.
Another insight concerns artillery platforms with high levels of automation. The extreme sophistication of automated systems creates challenges in harsh conditions, under prolonged use, and when supported by stretched logistics chains.
On-site repairs can be impossible. Operating these systems in degraded modes is further complicated by small crew sizes, with fatigue significantly reducing their effectiveness, especially under drone threats.
Ukrainian soldiers have testified to the problematic fragility of certain equipment, notably the Panzerhaubitze 2000 self-propelled howitzers. These advanced weapons are highly sensitive to dirt and moisture — materials in no short supply on the battlefield. The platforms come with their own vacuum cleaners, and soldiers report wearing slippers inside to avoid tracking in mud. After firing two full loads of ammunition, the howitzers reportedly require a day of servicing.
The apparent savings in manpower with automated systems is a false argument.
Firstly, on prolonged engagements, fatigue necessitates frequent crew rotation, regardless of computer-aided targeting or mechanical assistance for loading.
Secondly, larger crews can replenish ammunition themselves, whereas small-crew, highly automated guns require a specific replenishment vehicle, adding logistical strain. The Korean K9 and its K10 automatic ammunition resupply vehicle are one example.
Finally, overly sophisticated platforms often have higher fragility and fail to optimize “bang for buck.” Managing this balance enables the production of far more units for the same cost, creating a strategic advantage in high-attrition conflicts.
Global Implications for Artillery Procurement
The lessons from Ukraine have spurred global militaries to rethink their artillery strategies.
For example, Denmark is making significant strides to enhance its artillery capabilities through major procurement efforts.
Similarly, the Baltic states are not only ramping up their defense industrial capacity — particularly in ammunition production — but also investing in artillery acquisitions.
Meanwhile, Canada, grappling with outdated equipment, is undertaking a complete overhaul of its artillery assets as part of its Indirect Fires Modernisation program in an effort to bring its firepower capabilities into the modern era.
As militaries around the world rethink their artillery strategies, the lessons from Ukraine make one thing clear: success lies not in having the most advanced equipment but in striking the right balance between simplicity, efficiency, and sustainability.
In an era of renewed geopolitical tension, artillery systems must evolve to meet the demands of modern warfare — where resilience and flexibility often outweigh cutting-edge complexity.
Mark Fulton studied geopolitics, with a particular focus on defense policy.
He has worked as a senior consultant and research director for companies and professional groups, focusing for the last three years on the situation in Ukraine and its implications.
The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of The Defense Post.
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